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COMMENTS 
BILLS AND NOTES-PAYEES BY IMPERSONATION AND BY AssUMP-
TION OF A NAME-DRAWER'S INTENT AND COMMERCIAL POLICY-
Consider the following scheme for fraudulently obtaining money: 
A, a stranger to D, personally appears before D, represents him-
self as B and requests a loan. There is an existing person named 
B. For D's security a mortagage is produced in the name of B, 
but it has actually been penned by A. A check of the land records 
by D verifies that the land described in the mortgage is in fact 
owned by B. D, having satisfied himself as to the existence of B, 
draws a check payable to the order of B and hands it to A, the 
person before him. Since by the time the fraud is discovered A 
has indorsed the name B on the check, collected the cash and de-
parted, the loss will fall either on the drawer, the drawee, or the 
indorser. Disputes in determining who should bear the loss may 
take the form of a suit by the drawer against the drawee for rein-
statement of his account, 1 or by the drawer against an indorser 
upon a guarantee of prior indorsements,2 or by the drawee against 
the party he paid for restitution of payments made by mistake, 3 
or by the holder of the check against the drawer upon a contract 
of secondary liability,4 or by the holder against the drawee upon 
his certification.5 The dispute may appear in a suit by B for con-
version of the instrument payable to him by the drawer, 6 the 
drawee,7 or the indorser.8 It may also appear in a suit by a drawer 
against a notary public for a breach of a statutory duty of care in 
1 Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S.W. 423 (1921); Meyer v. Indiana 
Nat'l Bank, 27 Ind. App. 354, 61 N.E. 596 (1901); Land Title&: Trust Co. v. Northwestern 
Nat'l Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900). 
2Harsin v. Trust Co., 131 Colo. 595,284 P.2d 235 (1955); American Express Co. v. 
Peoples Sav. Bank, 192 Iowa 366, 181 N.W. 701 (1921); Central Nat'l Bank v. National 
Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D.C. 391 (1908). 
3 Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60 (1932); First Nat'l 
Bank of Hastings v. Farmers&: Merchants Bank, 56 Neb. 149, 76 N.W. 430 (1898). 
4 Greenberg v. A &: D Motor Sales, 341 Ill. App. 85, 93 N.E.2d 90 (1950); Burrows v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Minn. 499, 90 N.W. llll (1902); First Nat'l Bank v. American 
Exchange Nat'l Bank, 170 N.Y. 88, 62 N.E. 1089 (1902). UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
LAw § 61 provides: "The drawer •.. engages ••• that if it be dishonored .•• he will 
pay the amount thereof to the holder." 
5 Meridian Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N.E. 247 (1893); 
Merchants' Loan&: Trust Co. v. Bank of the Metropolis, 7 Daly 137 (N.Y.C.P. 1877). 
6 Fiore v. Ladd &: Tilton, 22 Ore. 202, 29 Pac. 435 (1892). 
7 Schweitzer v. Bank of America, 42 Cal. App. 2d 536, 109 P.2d 441 (1941); Dodge v. 
National Exchange Bank, 30 Ohio St. I (1876). 
SSlattery &: Co. v. National City Bank, ll4 Misc. 48,186 N.Y. Supp. 679 (N.Y. City Ct. 
1920). 
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certifying A to be B.9 Further, the dispute may arise as a suit by 
the holder of a regular bill of exchange against the acceptor on his 
acceptance contract.10 Because this opening fact situation is typical, 
and because the ultimate issue is really the same regardless of the 
form of the suit, these facts will serve as a basis for initial discussion. 
I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS ANALYSIS 
The very nature of the instrument here involved-the check 
drawn to order11-gives rise to the basic problem: to whose order 
is the check drawn? Analysis of this problem 1\Till be aided by an 
examination of the relationship between the drawer and the drawee 
and of the relationship between the drawer and an indorser or 
the holder of the check. 
The former relationship highlights the significance of the 
problem. When one deposits money with a bank he becomes the 
bank's creditor. On the basis of this relationship the law implies 
a contract by which the bank agrees to pay according to the order 
of the depositor.12 The depositor's checks become his orders, 
vis-a-vis the drawee,13 and it is only when the drawee has paid them 
according to the order that the terms of the deposit contract al-
low the drawee to charge the account of the depositor mth the 
amount of the check.14 In this contractual relationship, the drawee 
has assumed the risks of an absolute duty to identify the payee to 
whom payment has been ordered and any payment made other-
wise is at his peril.11s The drawee has made no reservation allow-
9 Hatton v. Holmes, ':Yi Cal. 208, 31 Pac. 1131 (1893). 
10 Heavey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 Pac. 727 (1904). UNIFORM 
NEGOTIABLE INSTlltlMENTS LAw § 62 provides: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument 
engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance .••• " 
11 In the case of bearer instruments, the problems discussed herein do not arise since 
such instruments are payable to anyone bearing the instrument rather than to the order 
of some specific person, and since such instruments can be negotiated merely by delivery 
without any indorsement under the terms of UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 30. 
BRI'ITON, BILLS AND NOTES § 9 (1943). 
12 Houser v. National Bank, 27 Pa. Super. 613, 615 (1905); Harter v. Mechanics Nat'l 
Bank, 63 N.J.L. 578, 580, 44 Atl. 715, 715 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 
126 N.Y. 318, 327, 27 N.E. 371, 372 (1891). Abel, The Impostor Payee: or Rhode Island 
Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161, 209. 
lS The bank is not liable on the check to the payee or an indorsee "unless and until 
it accepts or certifies the check." UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189. 
H Chism, Churchill &: Co. v. Bank, 96 Tenn. 641, 644, 36 S.W. 387, 388 (1896); Brixen 
v. Deseret Nat'! Bank, 5 Utah 504, 511, 18 Pac. 43, 45 (1888). 
111 Land Title Bank &: Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'! Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 35, 66 A.2d 
768, 770 (1949); United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 
513, 175 N.E. 825, 829 (1931). 
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ing him to charge the drawer's account with payments made to 
such a payee as might be ascertained by the reasonably prudent 
and diligent drawee. Hence, the amount of care exercised by the 
drawee in identifying the payee is wholly immaterial in deter-
mining whether he can charge the drawer's account.16 On the 
other hand, the drawee has not undertaken to insure the drawer 
against fraud.17 Neither has he obligated himself to ascertain the 
true name of the person the drawer intended to pay.18 To re-
quire of the drawee the ascertainment of fraud perpetrated on the 
drawer in addition to the identification of the person intended as 
payee at the time the drawer issued the check would subject the 
drawee to excessive risks and burdens in the payment of a check,19 
especially since the drawee typically has no knowledge of the cir-
cumstances in which the check was issued.20 Thus in determining 
whether the payment of the check by the drawee can be charged 
to the drawer's account, a court is faced with only one question: to 
whom has the drawer ordered payment? 
Although the relationship of the drawer to an indorser or 
holder of the check is determined by the order instrument itself 
16 Land Title Bank &: Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, supra note 15; United 
States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 513, 175 N.E. 825, 829 
(1931); McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 839, 211 N.W. 542, 545 (1927). 
Abel, supra note 12, at 209. 
17 United States v. Continental-American Bank &: Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271, 272 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 870 (1949); Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 
317, 227 s.w. 423, 424 (1921). 
18 Atlantic Nat'! Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1957); Employers 
Cas. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 140 Tex. 113, 115, 166 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1942). 
19 "[I]n such a case the risk is not the ordinary risk assumed by the bank in its 
implied contract with its depositor, but a largely increased risk, as it follows that a check 
thus fraudulently obtained will be fraudulently used; the bank is deprived of the protection 
afforded by the fact that a bona fide holder of a check will exercise care to preserve it 
from loss or theft, which are the ordinary risks; there is thrown upon the bank the risk 
of antecedent fraud practiced upon the drawer of the check, of which it has neither knowl-
edge nor means of knowledge." Land Title&: Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat'! Bank, 196 
Pa. 230, 234, 46 Atl. 420, 421 (1900). Accord, Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 
114, 118 (5th Cir. 1957); Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank &: Banking Co., 326 Mass. 
440, 95 N.E.2d 176 (1950). 
20 Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 317, 227 S.W. 423, 424 (1921). It has 
been argued that because the drawee has no knowledge of the circumstances in which the 
check was issued, he is not misled by the drawer's conduct, and his duty is to ascertain 
the true name of the impostor and to pay the money to the person whose true name is 
the same as that inserted as payee. The argument is that the drawee's risks are not in-
creased by the fraud because now he has two chances-determining the identity of the 
indorser and determining the genuineness of the indorsement signature-to discover that 
something is wrong with the check. National Metropolitan Bank v. Realty Appraisal &: 
Title Co., 47 F.2d 982, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Armstrong v. National Bank, 46 Ohio St. 
512, 523, 22 N.E. 866, 868 (1889). But this is true only if the drawee is already under the 
duty to ascertain the true name of the person with whom the drawer dealt. Cf. cases 
cited in note 18 supra holding the drawee does not have such duty. 
1961] COMMENTS 1221 
rather than by an extrinsic contract, the problem and its signifi-
cance are again the same. By operation of law, the check is a con-
tract by the drawer to pay the stated sum of money in the event 
that it is not paid by the drawee.21 In the opening fact situation, 
the fraudulent inducement will absolve the drawer of liability upon 
his contract of secondary liability, except as against a holder in due 
course.22 The latter status requires, inter alia, that the holder 
has acquired the instrument by negotiation.23 Negotiation of an 
order instrument necessitates an indorsement by the payee.24 
Hence, in order to determine if the indorsement is by the payee, 
the court must again ascertain to whom the drawer has ordered 
payment. 
Because the problem arises in the context of consensual rela-
tionships215 the solution depends substantially on the intent of 
the drawer.26 Admittedly there are many cases in which the literal 
language of the court suggests that other analyses are available. 
For example, it has been asserted that liability depends upon 
whether the negligence of the drawer, the drawee, or the indorser 
is the proximate cause of the loss, 27 or that as between two innocent 
parties the one causing the loss must bear its consequences,28 or 
that section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, by making 
21 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 61 provides: "The drawer by drawing 
the instrument ... engages that on due presentment the instrument will be accepted or 
paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary pro• 
ceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to 
any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it." 
22 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 55 provides that one obtaining an in-
strument by fraud has a defective title; this includes the impostor payee since he has no 
intention of repaying the loan. Section 57 provides that a holder in due course is immune 
to any defense based upon the defect of title of prior parties, while § 58 provides that in 
the hands of any other holder the negotiable instrument "is subject to the same defenses 
as if it were non-negotiable." Hence, if the holder is not a holder in due course, the 
drawer's defense of fraud is a good defense. BRITrON, BILLS AND NOTIS § 125 (1943). 
23 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 52 (4). Pensacola State Bank v. Thorn-
berry, 226 Fed. 611 (6th Cir. 1915). 
24 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 30 defines negotiation of an order instru-
ment as indorsement by the holder plus delivery. Where the check is held by the payee, 
his indorsement is required before a subsequent holder can become a holder in due course. 
Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Lattimore, 168 Ga. 547, 148 S.E. 396 (1929). 
25 Abel, supra note 12, at 223. 
26 Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 403, 10 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1937); Halsey v. 
Bank of New York&: Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 138, 200 N.E. 671, 673 (1936). 
27 Peninsular State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928); 
Harmon v. Old Detroit Nat'l Bank, 153 Mich. 73, 116 N.W. 617 (1908); Kelley v. Planters' 
&: Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 135 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). 
28 Central Nat'l Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D.C. 391, 404 (1908); 
Milner v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 Ga. App. 668, 145 S.E. 101 (1928). It has been argued that 
this explanation is a meaningless cliche which obscures the real problems. Abel, supra 
note 12, at 363. 
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forgery inoperative to pass title, places the loss on the drawee or 
the indorser.29 However, a close examination of the cases assert-
ing negligence or innocence as criteria reveals that usually the 
courts have assumed that the person who indorsed as payee was 
not the payee intended by the drawer.8° Furthermore, such 
criteria are often only make-weight factors which the courts stir 
into their opinions as a further, sympathy-evoking justification for 
their result.31 Finally, section 23 is not relevant. It begs the 
question since there cannot be a forgery until the intended payee 
is determined.32 Consequently, these cases are not theoretically 
inconsistent with an analysis proceeding from a premise of the 
drawer's intent. 
However, the drawer's intent is not the sole consideration. 
Although the contractual analysis is both persuasive and valid as 
a premise, it is limited in the area of negotiable instruments. The 
relationships here involved originated in the Law Merchant rather 
than in assumpsit.33 These relationships are designed for ends far 
broader than the immediate and particular interests of the two 
parties involved. The basic commercial policy of the Law Mer-
chant to encourage the use of means of financing transactions 
which reduce the burdens and risks inherent in the use of cash 
should not be ignored.34 Hence, in applying the usual contract 
analysis of the intent of the parties to negotiable instruments, the 
courts should endeavor to insure that the result does not unrea-
sonably impede the use of negotiable instruments.3cs To be sure, 
29 Marcus v. Peoples Nat'! Bank, 57 Pa. Super. 345 (1914); Morris Plan Bank v. Con-
tinental Nat'! Bank, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW§ 23 provides: "When a signature is forged or made without the authority 
of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to 
retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefore, or to enforce payment thereof 
against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the 
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the 
forgery or want of authority." 
30 See, e.g., Central Nat'! Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D.C. 391 
(1908); Levy & Salomon v. Bank of America, 24 La. Ann. 220 (1872); Peninsula State Bank 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928); States v. First Nat'l Bank, 20!1 Pa. 
69, 52 Atl. 13 (1902). 
31 See, e.g., Missouri Pacific R.R. v. M. M. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 3!15, 261 S.W. 895 (1924); 
Hoffman v. American Exchange Nat'! Bank, 2 Neb. Unoff. 217, 96 N.W. 112 (1901). Abel, 
supra note 12, at 200. 
32 Greenberg v. A & D Motor Sales, 341 Ill. App. 85, 9!1 N.E. 2d 90 (1950). 
33Abel, supra note 12, at 225. See generally BRITrON, BILLS AND NOTES §§ I, 2 
(1943); BEUTEL'S BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ch. 1 (7th ed. 1948). 
34 See BRITrON, BILLS AND NOTES § 1 (1943). 
35 United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust, 175 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949); Citizens' Union Nat'! Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 24, 
50 S.W.2d 60, 63 (1932); Burrows v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Minn. 499, 504, 90 N.W. 
1961] COMMENTS 1223 
upholding the intent of the drawer promotes this end by assuring 
drawers that their wishes will not be disregarded and that the 
use of negotiable instruments does not increase their risk of loss. 
But commercial policy also requires a market willing to accept 
the instruments; indorsers and drawees should not be driven from 
the market because of an unreasonably high incidence of loss. 
Consequently, the characterization of the drawer's intent must 
necessarily be bent by the consideration of loss allocation and the 
resulting effect upon the circulation of negotiable instruments. 
To illustrate, suppose the drawee bank receives two checks issued 
by the same drawer, check A obtained by an impostor and in-
dorsed by him and check B stolen and indorsed by a thief. When 
the drawee has paid these checks and has discovered the circum-
stances of each, he can charge check A to the drawer, as will be 
subsequently shown,36 but not check B37 because he paid check B 
upon a forged indorsement. When the drawee first receives the 
checks he cannot discern any difference between them and hence 
does not know that greater protective measures are required for 
check B than for check A. Indeed, he cannot distinguish either 
of these checks from perfectly safe checks. The drawee's willing-
ness to deal in negotiable paper and the protective measures he 
will take will be affected by his over-all probability of loss. If the 
drawee has to bear the risks for both of these checks, his increased 
probability of loss might require that he take fuller measures on 
all checks to satisfy himself of the identity of the presenting party 
and the indorsers, and the circumstances of issuance.38 This would 
hinder the circulation of commercial paper. On the other hand, 
if the drawer has to suffer both the losses, he will hesitate to issue 
negotiable instruments since he would be subject to losses even in 
circumstances beyond his control, such as indorsement by a thief, 
in much the same manner as if he used cash. Consequently, the 
losses on checks A and B are allocated rationally between the 
parties in the hope that the probabilities of loss will remain suffi-
ciently low for each person so that neither ·will be driven to use 
llll, lll3 (1902); Dartmouth Nat'l Bank v. Keene Nat'l Bank, 99 N.H. 458, 461, 115 
A.2d 316, 318 (1955). See generally Strahorn, The Policy or Function of the Law of Bills 
and Notes, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 662 (1939). 
36 This statement assumes that the drawer dealt with the impostor in person. See 
text accompanying note 40 infra for a textual discussion. 
37 See BRI'IT0N, Bru.s AND NoTES § 142 (1943). 
as Atlantic Nat'! Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114, ll8 (5th Cir. 1957); United States 
v. Continental-American Bank &: Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 
U.S. 870 (1949). 
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restrictive measures which would impede the free and confident 
circulation of negotiable instruments. This objective requires 
the application of loss allocation to checks payable to impostors 
as a policy limitation upon the interpretation of the drawer's 
intent. 
II. THE DRA WER's INTENT 
It is said that when the drawer executes the check he has a 
double intent. First, he intends to pay the physical being with 
whom he is dealing. Second, he intends to pay the person who has 
the same name as that inserted in the check as payee.39 The over-
whelming weight of authority holds that the drawer's dominant 
intent is to pay the physical person with whom he deals.40 In 
Robertson v. Coleman41 the court, in one of the more thoughtful 
opinions in this area, analyzes and explains the result: 
"The name of a person is the verbal designation by which 
he is known, but the visible presence of a person affords surer 
means of identifying him than his name. The defendants, 
for a valuable consideration, gave the check to a person who 
said his name was Charles Barney, and whose name they 
believed to be Charles Barney, and they made it payable to 
the order of Charles Barney, intending thereby the person to 
whom they gave the check. The plaintiff received this check 
for a valuable consideration, in good faith, from the same 
person, whom he believed to be Charles Barney, and who 
indorsed the check by that name. . .. It is clear from these 
facts, that, although the defendants may have been mistaken 
in the sort of man the person they dealt with was, this person 
was the person intended by them as the payee of the check, 
designated by the name he was called in the transaction, and 
that his indorsement of it was the indorsement of the payee 
of the check by that name."42 
39 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1939); Cohen 
v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 4fYl, 10 N.E.2d. 457, 461 (1937). BwrEL's, BRANNAN, 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 476 (7th ed. 1948). 
40 E.g., Cureton v. Farmers State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S.W. 423 (1921); Greenberg 
v. A & D Motor Sales, 341 Ill. App. 85, 93 N.E.2d 90 (1950); Montgomery Garage Co. v. 
Manufacturer's Liab. Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 295 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920); Halsey v. 
Bank of New York & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936). 
41141 Mass. 231, 232, 4 N.E. 619, 620 (1886). 
42But cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937), where the 
court held that the drawer could not intend the person dealt with unless he had negotiated 
directly with the impostor in person and that a fleeting acquaintance made just before 
issuing the check would not support such an intent. 
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Some courts explain that if the indorser or the drawee were to 
call the drawer before discovery of the fraud for a description of 
the payee so that the indorser or drawee could be sure he was 
paying the proper party, the drawer would describe the physical 
features of the person with whom he dealt.43 Other courts pre-
mise their explanation on the theory that checks are a substitute 
for cash and serve a cash function. If the drawer had had sufficient 
cash on hand, he would have paid the cash to the person appearing 
before him. But not having the cash, he gave the person an order, 
addressed to the drawee, directing and intending the drawee to 
pay cash to the person who appeared before the drawer and to 
charge the payment to the drawer's account.44 
Authority for the alternative proposition-that the drawer's 
dominant intent is to pay the named payee-is sparse45 except in 
cases where the impersonation is of someone known personally 
to the drawer46 or in other special circumstances.47 There may 
43 United States v. First Nat'! Bank, 131 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1942); Corinth Bank 
&: Trust Co. v. Security Nat'! Bank, 148 Tenn. 136, 252 S.W. 1001 (1923); Commercial 
Bank &: Trust Co. v. Southern Industrial Banking Corp., 16 Tenn. App. 141, 66 S.W.2d 
209 (1932). Aigler, Bills and Notes-Impostors in the Law of Bills and Notes, 46 MICH. L. 
REv. 787, 790 (1948). But cf. Rivara v. Delaware, L. &: W. R.R., 98 N.J.L. 290, 119 Atl. 
6 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1922), where one impersonated an employee in the payroll line and 
received the check of the employee and the court said that the drawer would describe the 
employee rather than the impostor. 
44 Greenberg v. A &: D Motor Sales, 341 Ill. App. 85, 92, 93 N.E.2d 90, 93 (1950); 
Market St. Title &: Trust Co. v. Chelten Trust Co., 296 Pa. 230, 145 Atl. 848 (1929). 
Aigler, supra note 43, at 791. This does not undermine the distinction between order 
instruments and bearer instruments. Order instruments are to prevent payment to some-
one other than the intended party but they are not to protect the drawer from the fraud 
of the party he intended to pay. On the other hand, payment of bearer paper is not 
restricted to the intended payee. 
45 Tolman v. American Nat'! Bank,, 22 R.I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901). 
46 United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 
825 (1931); Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876); Goodfellow v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 71 Wash. 554, 129 Pac. 90 (1913). Usually these impersonations are by correspond-
ence since it is difficult to impersonate in person one known by the drawer. But cf. 
Maloney v. Clark, 6 Kan. 53 (1870), where on similar facts the court put the loss on the 
drawer on the ground that the holder was innocent; the intended payee problem was not 
discussed. 
47 'Where one impersonates an employee and receives the check for that employee 
from the employer, the courts have usually held that the impostor's indorsement is a 
forgery. Miners'&: Merchants Bank v. St. Louis Smelting&: Ref. Co., 178 S.W. 211 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1915); Rivara v. Delaware, L. &: W.R.R., 98 N.J.L. 290, 119 Atl. 6 (Ct. Err. &: 
App. 1922); Simpson v. Denver &: R.G. Ry., 43 Utah 105, 134 Pac. 883 (1913); Rolling v. 
El Paso &: S.W. Ry., 127 S.'W. 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). Contra, Missouri Pac. R.R. v. 
M. M. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S.W. 895 (1924). Where an employee of the drawer 
sends in false invoices or pads the payroll and receives the checks, his indorsement is 
usually held to be a forgery. United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 
343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 
Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909); St. Paul v. Merchants Nat'! Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N.W. 
1226 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
be several reasons for the lack of authority. First, the forcefulness 
of the leading case urging this view is weakened by the court's 
reasoning that because there is a fraudulent impersonation the in-
dorsement is false and is thus a forgery.48 This does not follow. 
Even though the impersonation may be fraudulent, the forged 
character of the indorsement depends not upon this but upon 
whom the drawer intended to pay. A more compelling objection 
to the minority view is that it so increases the drawee's risk of 
loss that burdensome protective measures would be required of 
the drawee to insure that the indorsing or presenting party is in 
fact the intended payee as named by the drawer.49 This view 
would tend to impair the negotiability of all checks. Neverthe-
less, the proposition that the drawer intended to pay the person 
named is not without merit when measured solely in the terms of 
actual intent. In the opening fact situation the impostor im-
personated someone whose existence and name could be verified. 
There was certainly inducement value50 in impersonating that 
individual and using his name, and the deciding factor influencing 
the drawer to issue the check may not have been the personal 
persuasion of the person before him but the name used and the 
reputation serving it. However, the view that the drawer intends 
to pay the person named lacks support not only at common law, 
but also under statutory provisions in the jurisdiction where the 
view originated.51 
In reality, it is probable that these two alternatives do not ex-
haust the drawer's various intents. It may be that the drawer 
really intends to pay that individual, whoever it may be, who has 
the status of economic wealth which has been represented to him.52 
516 (1922); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891); National 
Sur. Co. v. National City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N.Y. Supp. 413 (1918). Contra, 
Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957). See cases cited note 
79 infra. 
48 Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 463, 48 Atl. 480, 481 (1901). This 
manner of reasoning is not unknown. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Hastings v. Farmers 
&: Merchants Bank, 56 Neb. 149, 76 N.W. 430 (1898); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 
N.Y. 318, 331, 27 N.E. 371, 374 (1891); Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun 317 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1876). 
49 See authorities cited note 35 supra. 
50 "The 'impostor' picks the name of an actual person with whose qualities, particularly 
economic, the victim is presumably acquainted. The impostor's plan is to gain an ad• 
vantage by pretending to be that other person." Aigler, When is a Payee an "Impostor'7 
2 ARIZ. L. REv. 78, 82 (1960). 
51 Rhode Island has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, R.I. GEN. L\ws ANN. 
§ 6A-l-101 (1956), which validates the impostor's indorsement. See note 82 infra. 
52 Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 162, 77 N.E. 693, 694 (1906); 
First Nat'l Bank v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 170 N.Y. 88, 91, 62 N.E. 1089, 1090 (1902) 
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Neither the physical identity of the person dealt with nor the 
naked name of the person represented has inducement value 
standing alone. The decisive factor is probably the impostor's 
representation that he is the owner of the land described, and 
upon the faith of this the drawer issues a check, intending the 
money to be paid to the landowner. However, with but few ex-
ceptions, 113 the strongest statements of this view are only dicta. 
The small number of cases discussing the view imply either that 
the bar has not been active in arguing it or that courts have not 
considered it meritorious.114 A serious obstacle to the application 
of the view stems from the practical consequences which would 
follow it. In order for anyone taking a check to protect himself, 
he would have to determine the circumstances in which the check 
was issued and the purpose for which it was issued; he would 
have to identify the landowner and to verify that the land01vner 
received the check from the drawer and that the indorsement 
was made by the landowner.1111 These increased burdens and risks 
could undermine the confidence and willingness of people to 
accept negotiable instruments, or they could force such protective 
measures that it would become more difficult to negotiate checks 
generally. The end result would be an impediment in the 
commercial stream. 
As fact situations vary, it becomes more difficult to justify realis-
tically the result in terms of actual intent. Surely, where the 
impersonation of the land01rner is accomplished by correspond-
ence, the argument in Robertson v. Coleman that "the visible pre-
sence of a person affords surer means of identifying him than his 
name" has no application since the drawer is unable to identify 
a payee by description.116 It is still possible to apply the rationale 
that the checks serve a cash function by assuming that the drawer 
would have sent cash to his correspondent but used an order 
instrument only to avoid appropriation by others of the payment 
while in transit. Nevertheless, without reference to this rationale 
and without satisfactory explanation for the departure from the 
(dictum); Sherman v. Corn Exch. Bank, 91 App. Div. 84, 86, 86 N.Y. Supp. 341, 342 
(1904); Goodfellow v. First Nat'l Bank, 71 Wash. 554, 558, 129 Pac. 90, 92 (1913) (dictum). 
Abel, supra note 12, at 183. Contra, McHenry v. Old Citizens Nat'! Bank, 85 Ohio St. 
203, 97 N.E. 395 (1911). 
118 Murphy v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 77 N.E. 693 (1906); Sherman 
v. Corn Exchange Bank, 91 App. Div. 84, 86 N.Y. Supp. 341 (1904). 
114 Abel, supra note 12, at 183. 
!SIi McHenry v. Old Citizens Nat'! Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N.E. 395 (1911). 
ISO Aigler, supra note 43, at 792. 
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premise of Robertson v. Coleman, the courts have held that the 
drawer intended to pay the person with whom he corresponded.57 
It may be that this is an instance wherein considerations of com-
mercial policy dictate the result regardless of actual intent al-
though few courts have overtly declared this to be the reason. 
The courts are on firmer ground in cases where the impostor 
claims to be the agent for the landowner, obtains the check 
drawn payable to the landowner, indorses the landowner's name 
and cashes it. This is generally considered to be a forged indorse-
ment.58 Some courts reason that the drawer intended to pay the 
person named, who is allegedly the principal.59 Others deem it 
sufficient to hold merely that whatever else may have been the 
drawer's intent, he believed that the agent and the principal were 
two different persons and therefore intended to pay someone other 
than the agent.60 
Thus it is apparent that while in theory the intent of the 
drawer is a correct and valid point of departure for the allocation 
of the loss from checks payable to an impostor, the intent required 
is more nearly the drawer's objective intent than his subjective 
intent. This is further illustrated by the tendency of most courts to 
impute intent on the strength of judicial precedents rather than to 
discover it by actual inquiry.61 Moreover, in many cases it is not 
possible to say that any one of the many factors comprising the 
drawer's intent is so dominant as to be considered the essence of 
his intent.62 Therefore, a court's assertion that the drawer had 
57 E.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819, 825 (D.C. Md. 1956); 
Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); Hoffman v. American 
Exch. Nat'! Bank, 2 Neb. Unoff. 217, 96 N.W. 112 (1901); First Nat'l Bank v. American 
Exch. Nat'l Bank, 170 N.Y. 88, 62 N.E. 1089 (1902). 
oSE.g., Russell v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868 (1911); Harsin v. 
Trust Co., 131 Colo. 595, 284 P.2d 235 (1955); First Nat'l Bank v. Pease, 168 Ill. 40, 48 
N.E. 160 (1897); Land Title Bank&: Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 
A.2d 76S (1949). 
59 See First Nat'l Bank v. Pease, supra note 58; Rogers v. Ware, 2 Neb. 29 (1873); 
Real Estate Land Title 8c Trust Co. v. United Sec. Trust Co., 303 Pac. 273, 154 Atl. 593 
(1931). 
60 See Russell v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 868 (1911). 
61 See Harsin v. Trust Co., 131 Colo. 595, 284 P.2d 235 (1955); Imperial Motors v. 
President &: Directors of Manhattan Co., 65 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. City Ct. 1946); North 
Philadelphia Trust Co v. Kensington Nat'! Bank, 328 Pa. 298, 196 Atl. 14 (1938); Town-
send, Oldham &: Co. v. Continental State Bank, 178 S.W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). 
62 "Perhaps, in truth, both intents are so inseparable that the choice of one intent 
rather than the other is purely arbitrary-an example of rationalization, perhaps un-
conscious, to reach a desired result." Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 407, 10 
N.E.2d 457, 461 (1937). In accord with this it has been stated as a general proposition 
that: "No scientific foundation whatever exists for the assertion that the component parts 
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a particular dominant intent is usually an indulgence in a legal 
fiction.03 Nevertheless, the legal fictions serve the valuable func-
tion of loss allocation, 64 and by use of the appropriate fiction losses 
can be so allocated among the various parties that no one of them 
will bear a burden which unduly restrains his use of commercial 
paper.05 Because of the difficulty of determining the drawer's 
actual intent and because of the importance of commercial policy, 
it would seem advisable that courts give more overt consideration 
to commercial policy in interpreting the drawer's intent. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
As indicated earlier, 66 defining the relationships of the drawer, 
the drawee, and the indorser in contractual terms renders the 
drawee's negligence immaterial as a premise for liability. But 
where the court finds that the indorsement is a forgery because it 
was not subscribed by the intended payee, the drawer's negligence 
becomes a factor. The forgery allows the drawer to avoid the loss 
by placing it either on the drawee because the check has not been 
paid to order, or on a subsequent indorser since section 23 of the 
Negotiable Instruments Law makes the forged indorsement in-
operative to pass any interest by which the subsequent indorser 
can force the drawer to pay.67 However, if the drawer has been 
negligent, he may be estopped from asserting the fact of forgery 
as a defense, 68 thereby excusing the drawee and the indorser from 
not strictly complying with their contractual obligations and en-
abling them to place the loss on the drawer. The drawer's negli-
gent conduct has in theory misled the drawee or indorser to pay 
of a complex stimulus [such as are involved in an impostor-payee situation, operating 
to produce a given reaction] .•. can be broken down and the resultant conduct attributed 
to any one of the isolated elements." Abel, supra note 12, at 229. 
OS Abel, supra note 12 at 231; Comment, 33 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 110 (1958). 
04 Abel, supra note 12, at 231. 
05 Cf. Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 433 (1953). 
oo See authorities cited in note 16 supra. 
07 See cases cited note 14 supra. See also note 22 supra. UNIFORM NEGOllABLE INSTRU· 
MENTS LAw § 23 makes a forged indorsement inoperative to pass title; see note 29 supra 
where the section is quoted in full. 
68 UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 23 indicates that the drawer can use the 
defense of forgery "unless the party, against whom it is sought to enforce such right 
[payment of the check as the party secondarily liable], is precluded from setting up the 
forgery or want of authority." 
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upon a forged indorsement69 and therefore the drawer is made 
to suffer the loss in the same manner as if the instrument had been 
paid to order. 
IV. THE AssuMPTION OF A NAME BELONGING To No PERSON 
Compare the following facts with the opening impostor situa-
tion: A, a stranger to D, appears before D and uses the name Zin 
selling merchandise to D which is to be delivered later. There is 
in fact no person named Z. D gives A a check, payable to Z, which 
A indorses in the name Z and cashes before absconding. D dis-
covers the fraud when he fails to receive the merchandise. Again, 
either the drawer, the drawee, or an indorser must bear the loss. 
Strictly speaking, this is not an impersonation by A of someone 
else but is merely a different means of verbal identification of the 
physical being A for the purposes of the particular transaction.70 
A has not put on the coat of any other person. A's situation is 
analogous to the author who publishes a book under a pen name 
which differs from his given name, or an entertainer who uses a 
stage name rather than his real name while before the footlights.71 
That someone unknown to both the drawer and the defrauding 
party may in fact have the assumed name does not change the 
character of the situation. There is no attempt to induce by 
making use of the reputation of another and the drawer is not 
aware that any reputation is attached to the name. 
Consequently, it is misleading to categorize these situations as 
impostor cases and mechanically apply the impostor rules. Yet 
this seems to be the choice of the courts.72 Little verbal cognizance 
is taken of the distinction between impersonation and the mere 
assumption of a name.73 Nevertheless, it is significant that the 
69 Boatsman v. Stockmen's Nat'l Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 499, 138 Pac. 764, 766 (1914); 
C. E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930); Citizens' 
Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 24, 50 S.W.2d 60, 63 (1932). But cf. Keel v. 
Wynne, 210 N.C. 426, 187 S.E. 571 (1936); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. 
Div. 1, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1017, affd, 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914). 
70 Aigler, supra note 50, at 82. 
71 The drafters of the Negotiable Instruments Law demonstrated awareness that one 
may transact business in an assumed name by providing in § 18 that one who has signed 
an instrument in his trade or assumed name shall be liable on the instrument as if he 
had signed in his true name. 
72 See, e.g., Meridian Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N.E. 247 
(1893); Forbes & King v. Espy, Heidelbach & Co., 21 Ohio St. 474 (1871); Corinth Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 148 Tenn. 136, 252 S.W. 1001 (1923). 
73 "These cases lose sight of the distinction between real and fictitious persons. In 
the latter case there is nobody to inquire about; no one, in fact, misrepresented; no one 
in the mind of one party other than the person with whom he is dealing." Tolman v. 
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courts, under an impostor analysis, have uniformly held that the 
drawer in an assumed name case intended to pay the person dealt 
with.74 Although the fact situation is different, the ultimate 
question is the same: to whom has the drawer ordered payment? 
Perhaps it is because the ultimate question is the same that the 
courts have so habitually decided the assumed name case by label-
ling it an impostor case and applying the impostor rules. Further-
more, the courts may not feel any compulsion to note the distinc-
tion because in the majority of instances the proper interpretation 
of the facts in an assumed name case will not change the result. 
However, the factual difference may be of some relevance to 
the particular attorney in the particular case since the various 
elements comprising the drawer's intent weigh quite differently 
in the assumed name situation. Basically, there is no other in-
dividual intruding in the drawer's mind because for him the as-
sumed name has no independent significance.75 Therefore, the 
drawer's intent to pay the person with whom he dealt is more 
dominant here than in the impostor situation. While it is possible 
that the drawer intended to pay whoever held the status represented 
-the owner of the merchandise-this analysis is still subject to the 
objection that it might impair negotiability by disproportionately 
increasing the risk of loss of the drawee and indorser. Conse-
American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 465, 48 At!. 480, 481 (1901). The distinction is also 
noted in Hartford Acc.&: Indem. Co. v. Middletown Nat'l Bank, 126 Conn. 179, 10 A.2d 
604 (1939), where the court held that indorsement by the party assuming the name was 
valid. But cf. American Express Co. v. Peoples Sav. Bank, 192 Iowa 366, 181 N.W. 
701 (1921); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 
(1909). The courts in these cases indicated that if there was no actual person by that 
name, no one could indorse the instruments. The court in Kohn v. Watkins, 26 Kan. 
691 (1882), felt that in this situation the issue became whether the check became bearer 
paper because the payee was fictitious. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 9 (3) 
declares that an instrument is bearer "when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or 
non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." 
Hence, these checks payable to one assuming a name are not bearer checks unless the 
drawer knew the payee was non-existing at the time he drew the check. Montgomery 
Garage Co. v. Manufacturers Liab. &: Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 At!. 296 (Ct. Err. &: App. 
1920). 
74E.g., Meridian Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N.E. 247 (1893); 
Elliott v. Smitherman, 19 N.C. 322 (1837); Merchants' Loan&: Trust Co. v. The Bank of 
the Metropolis, 7 Daly 137 (N.Y. C.P. 1877); Forbes &: King v. Espy, Heidelbach &: Co., 
21 Ohio St. 474 (1871); Corinth Bank &: Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 148 Tenn. 
136, 252 S.W. 1001 (1923). But cf. Eagan v. Garfield Nat'! Bank, IIS Misc. 76, 192 N.Y. 
Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1922), where the drawer made the check payable to the name assumed 
by one claiming to be the agent of the drawer's creditor and the court held that the 
drawer intended any agent of the creditor by that name, although there was in fact no 
such agent. 
75 Tolman v. American Nat'l Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 465, 48 At!. 480, 482 (1901) (dictum). 
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quently, although the courts may be somewhat perfunctory in their 
analysis of these cases, their conclusion that the drawer intended 
the person dealt with is more cogent than in the true impostor 
situation. 
Because the impostor label has been attached so frequently to 
the assumed name cases, it is not surprising to find that the varia-
tions in the impostor rule are carried over to the assumed name 
cases. Where the defrauding party deals with the drawer by mail, 
the courts hold that the drawer intended to pay the person with 
whom he corresponded.76 The weakness of this conclusion in the 
impostor case77 in terms of a strict intent analysis is that the drawer 
is no longer able to describe the person he intended to pay. How-
ever, the inability to describe the payee is not so serious in the 
assumed name case since there is no competing image arising in 
the drawer's mind. Furthermore, one may say that even if the 
drawer intended to pay the person named that person is the cor-
respondent since the name inserted as payee is his name as far as 
the transaction is concerned, and there is no other person known 
to the parties by that name. Where the defrauding party assumes 
a name and represents himself as an agent and the check is payable 
to an alleged principal, the courts apply impostor analysis to hold 
that the agent's indorsement is a forgery since the drawer dealt 
with him as the agent only and therefore intended someone else 
to be the alleged principal and payee.78 
In general, the facts of the assumed name case strengthen the 
result reached under an impostor analysis. While the courts ap-
parently do not feel compelled to note the distinction, in view of 
the courts' literal reliance upon a strict intent analysis without 
apparent emphasis of commercial policy, it would seem incumbent 
upon them to emphasize the distinction since it usually bolsters 
their holdings that the drawer intended to pay the person with 
whom he dealt or the person with whom he corresponded. 
76 Fidelity &: Deposit Co. v. Union Trust Co., 37 F. Supp. 3 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); Hart• 
ford Acc. &: Indem. Co. v. Middletown Nat'l Bank, 126 Conn. 179, 10 A.2d 604 (1939); 
First Nat'l Bank v. Whitaker, 136 Tex. 117, 147 S.W.2d 1074 (1941). 
77 See cases cited note 57 supra. 
78E.g., Strang v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 235 N.Y. 68, 138 N.E. 739 (1923); 
Armstrong v. Pomeroy Nat'! Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N.E. 866 (1889); Chism, Churchill 
&: Co. v. Bank, 96 Tenn. 641, 36 S.W. 387 (1896); Guaranty State Bank &: Trust Co. v. 
Lively, 108 Tex. 393, 194 S.W. 937 (1917). 
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V. AssUMPTION OF A NAME AND IMPERSONATION BY THE 
DRAWER'S EMPLOYEE 
In one instance, however, the result reached in an assumed 
name case under an impostor analysis may be less rational than 
in the corresponding impostor situation. Where an employee ob-
tains a check from his employer by assuming a name, filing false 
invoices, or padding the payroll and indorses the check in the as-
sumed name, it would seem consistent with the correspondence 
cases to hold that the drawer intended to pay the correspondent, 
thus validating the employee's indorsement. Indeed, this would 
seem to be the result suggested by the assumed name distinction 
since the name induces no competing image. Nevertheless, the 
cases are in agreement that the employee's indorsement is a forgery 
in both the assumed name case79 and the impostor case.80 This 
makes sense where the particular employee physically obtains the 
check under the pretense of delivering it to the payee, for this has 
the appearance of an agency situation, and indicates that the em-
ployer did not intend to pay the agent-employee.81 Further, in 
the impostor situation, it is possible to theorize that the drawer 
was induced by the name of the one impersonated and so did not 
intend to pay the correspondent employee who filed the invoice or 
padded the payroll. If the person impersonated was known to the 
drawer, such as a former employee or a regular supplier, the theory 
is acceptable. But not all of the cases meet this specification, and 
the theory cannot be extended to the case where the employee 
merely assumes a name since the name represents no image other 
than the correspondent-employee whom the drawer could have 
intended to pay. 
The real explanation of these cases may be found in a negative 
intent rationale which is somewhat analogous to the reasoning 
employed in the agency cases. If it is assumed that the drawer 
knows the names of his employees, he would recognize that the 
name which he is inserting as the payee is different. Believing 
70 Padded payroll: City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 
495 (1933); National Sur. Co. v. National City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N.Y. Supp. 
413 (1918); Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P .2d 135 
(1935). Contra, Atlantic Nat'! Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1957). False 
loan applications: First Nat'! Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 56 Neb. 149, 76 N.W. 
430 (1898); Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371 (1891). 
so See note 47 supra. 
81 See First Nat'! Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 56 Neb. 149, 76 N.W. 430 (1898); 
Board of Educ. v. National Union Bank, 16 N.J. Misc. 50, 196 Atl. 352 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
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that the payee is someone other than his employee, the drawer 
would thus intend to pay someone other than his employee. If 
the drawee were to call the drawer and describe the person pre-
senting the check, the drawer would say that he did not intend to 
pay that person because that person is his employee and he in-
tended to pay someone else. This theory applies equally well 
whether the employee is an impostor or merely assumes a name. 
However, application of the negative intent rationale to corporate 
employers is clearly an indulgence to explain the conclusion since 
usually the drawer does not immediately know the names or 
descriptions of the many employees. Nevertheless, in the broad 
perspective, such an indulgence may be justified in the interest of 
allocating losses for the purpose of preserving the drawer's, the 
drawee's and the indorsers' willingness to use negotiable instru-
ments. 
VI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE82 
The Uniform Commercial Code has taken affirmative action 
regarding some of the situations herein discussed. Section 3-405 
states: 
"(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a 
named payee is effective if 
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has in-
duced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument 
to him or his confederate in the name of the payee; 
or 
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or draw-
er intends the payee to have no interest in the in-
strument; or 
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has 
supplied him with the name of the payee intending 
the latter to have no such interest. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil 
liability of the person so indorsing."83 
It is readily apparent that the code places the loss on the draw-
er in more situations than does the present law. For example, 
under the code the drawer will bear the loss in all cases of imper-
82 The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by the following states: Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming. 
83 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE § 3-405. Emphasis added. 
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sonation, even though the impersonation is of someone the drawer 
knows personally. In addition, where the drawer's defrauding 
employee provides the name of a payee he is impersonating, the 
code again places the loss on the drawer by giving effect to the 
employee's indorsement. The drafters' comments for subsection 
I (c) explain this provision with hypothetical situations of an em-
ployee padding the payroll, but the exact language of the provision 
would seem to be broad enough to cover the employee who files 
fictitious invoices and receives and indorses the checks. On the 
other hand, as the comments make clear, the code makes no provi-
sion for the case where one poses as the agent for another and the 
drawer makes the check payable to the principal; the indorsement 
required is still that of the principal and not of the supposed agent. 
Several justifications are offered in the comments for these 
particular provisions. One is that the drawer intends to pay the 
person dealt with. Another is that the drawer is the party better 
able to prevent the forgery through the exercise of reasonable 
care. Actually, it would seem that the code's greatest advantage 
is simply providing more definite rules for this area. Certainty 
of result decreases litigation and increases the confidence and will-
ingness to deal with negotiable paper. Thus the code appears to 
be a legislative determination that having more definite statutory 
rules promotes the fundamental policy of insuring the utility of 
negotiable instruments, that the drawer can bear these additional 
losses ·without so increasing his risks as to restrict his use of 
negotiable instruments, and that the circulation of negotiable in-
struments will be encouraged by removing these risks of loss from 
the drawee and the indorser. 
Nevertheless, the code does not directly attack the assumed 
name situation. Although subsection 1 (c) appears to be broad 
enough to cover the employee who assumes a name in padding the 
payroll or in filing false invoices, some doubt is created by the 
phrase "intending the latter to have no such interest." This 
phrase seems to require the existence of a person with the assumed 
name whom the employee does not intend to receive the check. 
This makes little sense in the case of an employee assuming a 
fictitious name, for the very thing he does intend is that the payee 
named is to get the money since he is that person and is so named 
for the particular transaction. However, there does seem to be 
evidence of an awareness that one can assume a name for a par-
ticular transaction. Section 3-401 provides that one can be liable 
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on an instrument although he signs in his assumed name.84 In 
view of the case history, the code provisions and the fact that the 
question of the intended payee is common to both the impostor 
and the assumed name case, it seems highly probable that under 
the code the courts will :find that the drawer intended to pay the 
person who merely assumed a name. This also would seem to be 
within the spirit of subsection I ( c). 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the check is obtained by impersonation or the mere 
assumption of a name, conceptually, the intent of the drawer is a 
technically correct premise for placing the loss. However, this is 
not as so many courts unfortunately seem to conclude the sole 
consideration or the end in itself. If the courts persist in analyz-
ing the cases as if they are ascertaining the drawer's actual intent 
and nothing more, it is incumbent that full use be made of the 
facts and all available arguments. This calls for both the full 
utilization of the facts in the assumed name case and a clear 
enunciation of the negative intent rationale in the appropriate 
situation. However, the courts should recognize and apply the 
broader considerations of commercial policy. Not only is it 
nearly impossible to ascertain a true dominant intent, but in the 
long run it is important to consider the significant commercial in-
terest which will be promoted by the wise allocation of the losses 
from these checks. 
Stuart S. Gunckel, S. Ed. 
84 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-401 states: "(1) No person is liable on an instru-
ment unless his signature appears thereon. (2) A signature is made by use of any name, 
including any trade or assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any work or mark used 
in lieu of a written signature." 
